few coefficients. As they tell it, their revisionary interpretation helps to vindicate both the microlevel theory of party identification as a stable psychological attachment and the macrolevel theory of a partisan division largely immune from major political shocks. In their preferred model, macropartisanship is a stationary series oscillating in long cycles around its long-term mean, propelled largely by shocks of unknown origin. Curiously, they offer no discussion of the possible implications of this model, which suggests that party fortune is little affected by party performance.
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler are able researchers, but in this instance they manage to overlook effects that are hiding in plain sight. We welcome this opportunity to set the record straight. In our response, we emphasize two major points.
First, macropartisanship is driven largely by the same political and economic forces that drive presidential approval and consumer sentiment. When political and economic events. cause approval and sentiment to change, macropartisanship also changes. The changes are small but permanent and cumulating, so that macropartisanship at any moment is largely the sum of the preceding economic and political shocks. Changes in macropartisanship from other sources that do not register in the approval and sentiment series (such as election campaigns and their aftermath) are mostly transient and of little long-term consequence.
Second, the perceived inconsistency between macrolevel movement and microlevel stability is nothing more than a statistical illusion. Our macrolevel evidence and interpretation are in harmony with the evidence and interpretation (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960 ; Green and Palmquist 1994) that microlevel party identification behaves as a stable psychological attachment.
Putting the parts together, we offer the following model for reconciliation of macrolevel and microlevel findings. (1) The time series of individual-level party identification represents an initial partisan disposition that is slowly modified by events, including the national political and economic forces that shape party fortune. The graphed lines represent the raw data, unadulterated except for the standardization of scales to enhance the visual display.' As we view these data, party identification tracks approval, which tracks consumer sentiment. Not all approval trends stem from consumer sentiment. But virtually all detectable shifts in macropartisanship reflect the movement of approval and (perhaps indirectly) consumer sentiment. Does this informal assessment stand up to statistical scrutiny? Green et al. say "no." While accepting our assessment of the effect of consumer sentiment on approval (MacKuen et al. 1989), they claim that we exaggerate these variables' influence on macropartisanship. They believe we "overfit" the data, particularly 1 In Figure 1 , the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (MICS) and presidential approval are scaled in standard deviation units, while macropartisanship is scaled in 1.5 standard deviation units. This calibration allows approximately identical variances to the change scores in the three variables. Each series is depicted as centered around the within-administration mean, with the approval series centered two units higher than MICS and macropartisanship centered two units higher than approval.
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by our use of dummy variables for presidential administrations as controls. They prefer to report results without these controls, due to the presidential dummies' alleged lack of theoretical relevance. Their imposition of this statistical rule appreciably diminishes the coefficients for consumer sentiment and presidential approval and by itself accounts for much of the present disagreement.2 Virtually all the ambiguity that they generate regarding our earlier claims is due to their omission of controls for presidential administration. Table 1 presents two versions of a partial adjustment model predicting macropartisanship (percentage of Democrats among Democratic and Republican partisans) from current (Gallup) approval, one with and one without the presidential dummies.3 (Consumer 2 Not a matter of contention is use by Green et al. of all available Gallup surveys rather than the sample we used in our 1989 work. Their better measure of macropartisanship allows them to revise downward the coefficients for consumer sentiment and presidential (or "political") approval, while revising upward the coefficients for lagged macropartisanship. As they explain, the revised coefficients follow from the improved measurement of the control variable of lagged partisanship. We accept the revised numbers from their replications over our original coefficients when applied to our original models. 3 Table 1 includes an MA(1) term to replicate the statistical practice of our replicators. The statistical analysis is virtually unchanged when the MA(1) term is omitted. The justification for the MA(1) by Green et al. is that it serves as an adjustment for sampling error, following Beck (1989) . Yet, this adjustment is valid only when the underlying model is an AR(1) process, which we see as invalid for the macropartisanship data (discussed later). If the model were AR(1), then the sentiment is omitted here because its effect is largely indirect.) As the table shows, the approval coefficient is virtually cut in half when the presidential dummies are eliminated.4 How should one interpret this result?
The larger approval coefficient with the dummies represents the averaging over nine separate withinadministration time series (Eisenhower through Clinton I), controlling away between-administration differences. For each administration, support for the presidential party is highest when approval is highest: about one point of macropartisanship gained for every ten points of approval. Green 5 Green et al. appear to argue that administration dummies are not statistically significant. They report that our "slew" of 24 control variables, including the administration dummies, is not collectively significant for the period of our 1989 study. But that is without MICS or approval in the equation! Indeed, administration dummies achieve no more than borderline significance when the dummies and lagged macropartisanship are alone on the right-hand side of the equation. The reason the dummies gain dramatically in significance when when approval is entered into the equation will become clear as the discussion progresses. Presidential dummies are proxies for the equilibrium level of macropartisanship derived from cumulative political and economic approval over time. Our challenge is that none of these models fit empirically. Model I cannot be true by the simple test that macropartisanship moves too much. Models II and III do not fit the data well (at least without adding time-dependent dummy variables), which we know from Green et al. (1998) . This verdict presents the following puzzle. How may partisanship (1) be largely shaped by early political learning and remain essentially stable during adulthood, (2) show real change in the aggregate, and (3) be effectively modeled as a function of its political and economic environment?8
Our solution is a revised blending of the two models of partisanship as permanence and change. To the extent the partisanship of mature adults is constrained by early socialization, in effect there must be no "forgetting" of partisan information learned during early adulthood, adolescence, and before. Of course, we also expect partisan learning to continue during adulthood. We suggest that the retention rate for partisan learning should not depend on the location in the partisan life cycle. If early socialization leaves a permanent imprint, then any later changes in partisan disposition must also be permanent. It makes no sense to argue that people discount their recent past but cannot shake off their distant past.9 Thus, we expect the equilibrium value of partisanship (macro and micro) to represent the cumulation of its various causes, with no "forgetting."
This reasoning implies that while partisanship changes only slowly, its changes are permanent rather than transitory. When political and economic events affect presidential approval and/or consumer sentiment, the corresponding effect on macropartisanship will be small. But while these influences on approval or consumer sentiment wear off quickly, the small effects on macropartisanship stay, so that macropartisanship represents the accumulation of political and economic news.
Crucial to our understanding is that the stable, integrated series represents partisanship at equilibrium rather than its observed (macro or micro) realization. At the individual level, this formulation is consistent with Green and Palmquist's (1990, 1994) statistical portrayal of individual-level stable party attachments that rarely change. Most adults work out a social and psychological niche in which they encounter information, or interpret information, in ways that rarely threaten their understanding of the party system. While people can and do see reasons for changing their party loyalty, other factors usually "bring them home." These include psychological mechanisms, such as selective perception, internal counterarguing, and a need for psychological order; they also include such social elements as the issue considerations that frame political argument, the weight and direction of the frequently consulted mass media, and, of course, the political views of relevant others. For most people most of the time, these conditions and mechanisms will remain in balance. Thus, partisanship itself is not merely a verbal self-description but is the product of a self-regulating social and psychological system. Crucially, partisanship is a marker for the equilibrium conditions generated by a constellation of social and psychological forces. The equilibrating nature of partisanship (macro and micro) is important for politics because the resulting stability anchors the future to provide predictability.10 Equilibrium partisanship implies a distinctive dynamic: When party identification is at equilibrium, it will not change without outside surprises. Simply speaking, a Democrat with Democratic friends and liberal policy views who lives during good times presided over by a Democratic government will remain a Democrat unless something remarkable happens. Of course, unusual events may change the mix-the individual may move into new friendship circles, the national issue debate may induce conservatism, or the performance of the parties may fluctuate. To the extent to which these factors constitute the equilibrating mechanism, equilibrium partisanship will change in response to these shocks. Thus, we have APIDit* = uit, where PIDit* is an individual's equilibrium parti-sanship, and ui, is the shock or innovation at any time. This implies that equilibrium partisanship is a cumulation of all previous innovations in the individual's lifetime (plus an initial partisanship)": PIDt* = (Uit + Uist-1 + Uit-2 + . . . ) + PIDo*.
In addition, we expect some people to stray temporarily from their equilibrium partisanship-perhaps attracted by particular personalities or moved by specific events. For instance, the Democratic partisan of our example may be seduced by a charismatic candidate to support the Republicans but will sooner than later "return home" to equilibrium partisanship. This produces:
where (PIDit -PIDit*) is the temporary deviation from equilibrium partisanship, and vit represents shortterm forces that deflect voters from their partisan equilibrium. These temporary deviations are based entirely in the present and are eventually "forgotten." Thus, equilibrium partisanship integrates history, whereas the temporary deviations disappear. These two parts imply that, to the extent to which equilibrium partisanship itself is unaffected by the personal environment and national forces, all movement will represent temporary deviation, and individual partisanship itself should be a stationary series. At the macrolevel, the individual-level uit and vit shocks cancel out, except for their mean values, which we label att and et, respectively. The macrolevel extension is straightforward. We have an observed macropartisanship, Mt, and its equilibrium value, Mt*, where: The ott inputs for macropartisanship represent the cumulated political and economic shocks to macropartisanship.12 But we need not represent these shocks as mere white noise. We model the cumulated att as a function of the cumulated shocks to presidential approval and consumer sentiment. Our argument is that to know the cumulated political and economic shocks to approval and consumer sentiment is largely to know the equilibrium value of partisanship. Next, we put this argument to the test. We are now ready to reexamine the responsiveness of macropartisanship to economic and political forces. We want to model Mt,* the equilibrium condition of macropartisanship (Mt). For M,* to be statistically integrated (no "forgetting"), current innovations must be uncorrelated with lagged values. This condition is readily accomplished by modeling macropartisanship not as a function of consumer sentiment and approval per se, but as a function of the innovations in these variables, et and at from equations 1 and 2. In this formulation, changes in consumer sentiment and presidential approval do not directly cause macropartisanship; rather, the economic and political events responsible for these changes also cause macropartisanship to change. The innovations in consumer sentiment and approval represent surprises, that is, changes in the economic or political climate unanticipated by the previous levels of consumer sentiment and approval.
Before we proceed, there are a few additional preliminaries. To gauge how the dynamics evolve, it is helpful to separate the flows of political and economic influences on Mt*. Consumer sentiment reflects the workings of economic forces that operate largely but not entirely via approval. Complicating matters is the greater delay in the effects of economic news compared to political news. Consequently, we purge the innovations in approval (a,) of the portion due to economic news (et). We do this by regressing at on et and et_1, taking residuals. These new residuals represent the political innovations (Pt) in approval, purged of the economic innovations. We also must adjust both sets of innovations to take into account the party controlling the presidency. We do so by multiplying each by a party variable scored +1 when the president is a Democrat and -1 when the president is a Republican, while scaling macropartisanship as the percentage of Democrats. In this way, good news adds to Democratic identification, given a Democratic president, but sub- 13 One sign is that the over-time correlations are far stronger than they should be, given the autocorrelations at short lags. For instance, considering that the Gallup autocorrelation is .92 over one quarter and assuming an AR(1) model, the autocorrelation should be .9212 after 12 quarters, or a mere .37. The observed autocorrelation after 12 quarters is .58, indicating a long-memoried process. By contrast, after 12 quarters the autocorrelations for MICS and approval (same president) drop to .18 and .08.
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tracts from it in the case of a Republican president.14 Finally, we measure the cumulated versions of the pt and et series. We start each cumulative series at 0 in 1953:1 and add scores.15
MACROPARTISANSHIP, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY
Armed with theory and data, we test the plausibility of our dynamic equilibrium formulation. In the Green et al. model, macropartisanship responds minimally and gradually to political and economic innovations, eventually trending toward a constant long-term equilibrium. In our proposed model, macropartisanship cumulates the effects of political and economic forces, thus undergoing permanent changes over time. We construct an error correction model (ECM) of change in macropartisanship as a function of the innovations in political and economic news plus the reequilibration of previous "errors" toward the equilibrium level of macropartisanship. We explicitly specify the equilibrium level to be a cumulative function of political and economic conditions. In abstract form, the model is:
and the equilibrium is:
where We see that CE and cp are decisively nonzero (a joint test produces p = 0.00000). The equilibrium M,* is a dynamic function of the political and economic environment. Furthermore, if we add administration dummy variables, they neither are statistically significant nor affect the other coefficients in an appreciable way. In short, by explicitly modeling the enduring component of macropartisanship in terms of its underlying cumulative economic and political causes, we account for the historical "effects" otherwise represented by administration dummies and resolve the empirical dispute raised by Green et al. More important, we affirm that the crucial part of macropartisanship-its equilibrium condition-is driven by political and economic information.
More is revealed in equation 4 than the likely existence of a moving equilibrium. We observe from the (Mt-, -Mt-1 *) coefficient that in the absence of Mt* change, macropartisanship moves toward its equilibrium value to fill about 20% of the gap per quarter. We also observe a distinctive dynamic response of macropartisanship to politics compared to economics. Political shocks (Pt) produce an immediate reaction in macropartisanship of 0.111 points per unit shift. Thus, when the equilibrium shift is in the form of a changing political input, we obtain nearly the full movement toward the new equilibrium (0.111 of 0.126 points). For economics, in contrast, a one-point innovation in Et yields only an 0.055 immediate response, which is only one-third of the way toward the new equilibrium (0.169 points higher than before). In subsequent periods, both deviations will reequilibrate at a rate of 0.198, but the major movement in the political part will have already occurred. Thus, we see that the political part of equilibrium partisanship reacts almost immediately to exogenous shocks, while the economic part reacts only partially, that is, gradually. This makes sense in that people understand quickly the partisan meaning of political news, but they take longer to appreciate the partisan implications of economic change.17 
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where PIDit* is the "true" value of party identification, and ut is its normally distributed disturbance. The variables are mean-centered to omit the intercept. 
where, as we now see, P = 1. The intercept oCt represents a uniform shock shared by all citizens at time t due to a common reaction to shared events, while uit is the individual variation around 'Ott due to variation in individual experience and evaluation. At the macrolevel, the uit terms cancel out, so that only national forces matter. The result is that oCt = APID *t = kzXMt*, so that microlevel change and macrolevel 24 Voters from the pre-Depression generation respond to contemporary stimuli in modern polls, but they remain less Democratic than the post-Depression era generation.
25 To prorate estimates of P for the quarterly time frame, we take 3 reported over c quarters to the (1/c) power. In addition to the two NES panels with waves two years apart, Green and Palmquist (1994) also present estimates for four additional adult panels involving shorter time intervals. If we estimate P from pooling six separate estimates from six panels, we obtain a sample mean of 1.00, with a range (from panel to panel) of 0.99 to 1.01.
change are now equivalent, except for a constant k to correct for different scales. This directs us to the crucial puzzle. How can we reconcile the "large" macrolevel movement in macropartisanship (XMt,*) with the relatively "small" amount of microlevel change represented by the variance in Uit? This discrepancy exemplifies the typical illusion of a large change at the macrolevel appearing small at the microlevel. We demonstrate by resealing AMt* in party identification units and comparing its variance with the variance in quarterly individual-level movement in equilibrium partisanship, uit. For a plausible result, there should be less variance in the common movement represented by Ctt = kAMt* than in the individual deviation around this movement represented by uit, since most movement of microlevel partisanship probably depends on idiosyncratic reasons rather than national forces.
Green and Palmquist (1994) provide four estimates of the variance in uit from the four-year NES panels, which we prorate for quarterly time intervals to obtain the estimate of 0.032.26 To compare this variance with that for AMt * we need the conversion rate k to transform AMt* into microlevel seven-point-scale units. We can approximate k using 
APPENDIX The Error Correction Model and Macropartisanship
The error correction model (ECM) is a standard formulation in which current change has two components: one due to current inputs, and one due to a reequilibration or a return to a sustainable value. In our application, the first part is straightforward: People react to political and economic information. The idea of the second part is that if M,-1 were out of equilibrium-for example, if people overreact to good news-then people would move back toward the partisanship that is consistent with their psychological and social environment, hence "error correction."
The If the immediate effects were substantially higher than the long-run implications, bp > cp, public overreaction to political news, the public would then readjust to the more modest change in equilibrium partisanship. Finally, if the immediate influence is only a fraction of the long-run implication, bp < cp, then we have evidence for a partial adjustment to the new dynamic equilibrium. The short-run dynamics are a function both of the ratio bp/cp (which is the proportion of the equilibrium effect felt immediately) and of the "return to equilibrium" parameter y, which shows the proportion of the remaining disequilibrium (M, -Mt*) is adjusted away each quarter.
If CE and cp are zero in equations 3a and A-la, then the equilibrium Mt* becomes the constant co, and equations 3 and A-1 reduce to AM, = bEEt + bpP, -d(M,-, -co Second, Mt* avoids the calamity of a run to the 0% and 100% boundaries because of its slow speed of movement. In theory, the net change in a unit-root variable will have zero mean with a variance equal to mVar(ut), where m is the number of periods and ut is the change over interval t. The variance in AMt* is a shade under 1.0, so the expected variance over m quarters is about equal to the number of quarters. For instance, following a century of change, the expected variance is about 400, and the expected standard deviation is about 20. With a standard deviation of 20, half the cases are within 16 points of the mean. Thus, the median absolute value of AMt* over several runs of 100 years is a mere 16 percentage points.
Because the bounded variable works well enough and because we want to keep the measure easily interpretable ("percentage Democratic" rather than "log of the odds that a partisan is a Democrat"), we chose to follow convention and use percentages, even though we expect an integrated behavioral process.
Recursive Residuals
One interpretation of the innovations in approval and economic sentiment is that these represent the degree of positive/negative surprise conditional upon the lagged levels of the variables. To estimate these innovations, we merely regress the current value on the previous value and take the residuals, with the intent that these represent actual surprises. A plausible alternative is to generate the "recursive" residuals. In that case, the "surprise" is estimated for every time point using only the historical data available up to that time, as if the public could perform these regressions using history when they form their judgments.
The obvious attraction of recursive residuals is that people know history but not the future; for instance, people living in 1956 could not have known the course of events for the next 40 years and thus could not have used those data to estimate persistence functions. It is awkward to assume, however, that everyone's historical monitoring began precisely at the time when our statistical monitoring began, in 1953. In defense of our use of regular residuals we assume that citizens early in our time span used pre-1953 information to estimate the persistence functions and that these estimates are similar to those using later information as well.
If the persistence function changes over time, then there may be an advantage to using the recursive residuals. If the persistence function is relatively stable, however, then this advantage disappears. Furthermore, the recursive residuals approach produces poor estimates at the beginning of the series because the data are too slim for the task.
We compared estimates of our model using both methods. For the recursive residuals model we follow the exact same procedures as we did for the "simple residuals" estimates of the innovations in economic sentiment and political approval, this time substituting the recursive residuals for the simple residuals. In the end, the two procedures produce statistically indistinguishable estimates. The result is decisive. M* is driven by aggregate pocketbook considerations and the political component of approval but not by business expectations. Partisan self-identification, quite unlike approval of a president, is a matter of personal experience rather than informed speculation. Thus, while economic expectations can affect a president's popularity, any long-term effect on macropartisanship depends on whether the expectations are followed by their predicted realizations.
Decomposing Economic Shocks
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For the presidential party's economic policies to alter the electorate's collective partisan memory, anticipation is not enough. The effects must be felt by the voters.
